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President Niinistö’s security report overlooks the following three tensions 

What lies at the heart of President Sauli Niinistö’s recent security report is the hard security in Europe now and in the medium term. The report is less focused on the long-term societal impacts of changes in the security environment.

Writers

Jukka Vahti

Senior Lead, Foresight and Training

Rosa-Maria Mäkelä

Specialist, Foresight and Training

Otto Tähkäpää

Specialist, Foresight and Training

Published

The report on the crisis resilience of European societies prepared by President Sauli Niinistö for the European Union was published at the end of October. The content of the report has already been extensively scrutinised in the media, but what does it look like when examined through a foresight lens? In this article, we highlight our observations from the perspective of security and the future. 

Niinistö’s report is a reaction to the war of aggression Russia launched in Ukraine in 2022. It took most EU Member States by surprise and revealed shortcomings in their preparedness. While Ukraine is already entering its third winter of war, the security environment in Finland and the European Union is also shaped by climate change, the narrowing of the living space of democracy, the erosion of the international system, as well as slowly advancing phenomena of change that shape the future security environment in the long term, such as the geo-economic superpower struggle between the US and China. 

In the current times of overlapping crises, the future horizon of societies and people is becoming narrower and is strongly focused on the present. Therefore, to support decision-making and pluralistic public debate, which is an integral part of democracy, we need not only situational awareness and traditional security analysis, but also a longer-term perspective provided by foresight, and a comprehensive understanding of the transformation of the security environment and its interlinked impacts on Finnish society.  

At Sitra’s Foresight, we are currently conducting an analysis of the long-term societal impacts of the transformation of the security environment. We examined Niinistö’s report through three cross-cutting tensions that have emerged in our analysis so far. These tensions are found on the axes short-term—long-term, preservation—renewal, and consensus—diversity of opinion.

Future horizon: short vs. long term 

A traditional military conflict or its threat understandably forces us to look close, both in terms of time and geography. From the perspective of foresight, one cross-cutting tension related to changes in the security environment relates to the time span and runs between the short and long term. Niinistö’s report focuses mostly on the present and the medium term. We should remember, though, that the long-term future is also built through decisions and choices made in the midst of crises.  

Overall, in addition to the threat of war, Niinistö’s report does take into account other long-term changes to the security environment, such as the climate crisis, the threat of pandemics and dependencies related to critical technologies. When it comes to these threats, the starting point of the report is to alert EU Member States to prepare also, and above all, for the worst-case scenarios.  
There are certainly grounds for preparing for the worst. However, the better we could perceive the time spans of different threats and the tensions related to preparedness, the easier it would be to discuss the allocation of resources needed to ensure security. In addition, strategic decision-making becomes easier when we have a shared understanding of changes over different time spans. It is also impossible to imagine other kind of surprising futures unless we can identify and question our assumptions concerning the future. In connection with preparing for more surprising futures, Niinistö’s report talks about collective “cognitive dissonance” – the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression showed that we could not envision that something so ‘unimaginable’ could become a reality.  

Preparedness: preservation vs. renewal  

The second key tension is related to preparedness, which, by its very nature, appears as a preservative activity. Through preparedness, we aim to prevent undesirable changes to the current situation and to ensure the continuity management of societies. The risk is that, in a time focused on preparedness, the ethos of preservation will also sneak to areas where renewal would be necessary due to an acute crisis or developments advancing at a slower pace, such as climate change. 

In a systemic transformation of the security environment, in which security, the economy and technology are intertwined, preparedness aimed at preserving existing structures is not sufficient to safeguard the preconditions for security in the long term.  
 
For example, the report calls for a faster ability to respond to and recover from crises affecting the economy, such as a pandemic. At the same time, we know and the report also states that the economic structures are undergoing a transformation. Changes are taking place in the world economy and in the business environment. There, we cannot necessarily expect a return to a world of free trade or a market-driven economic policy. This change is the result of the competition between the US and China, fought particularly through the economy. Adapting to changes requires us to reform our modes of operation and business models, not only an ability to recover from crises affecting the economy. 

Debate on security: consensus vs. diversity of opinion 

The third tension related to the transformation of the security environment concerns, on the one hand, the consensus-oriented nature of the societal debate on security and the future and, on the other, the diversity of opinion required by resilience. In the short and medium term, unity and the demand for it in security dialogue and decision-making are a natural response to an unexpected external security threat, such as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. 

In such a situation, responding quickly and decisively to a changed security situation requires a certain degree of consensus on the threat and the means to prepare for it. By contrast, in the longer term, excessive or prolonged unanimity may have quite the opposite effects. It can lead to an atmosphere of necessity and resignation, therefore narrowing the scope of foresight and future prospects. In the long term, this may weaken both security and resilience, as well as democracy. 
 
In Niinistö’s report, citizens play a key role in preparedness and as guarantors of security. Citizens’ own activity, trust and capabilities are seen as a resource that affects both the individual’s own immediate security and the unity of society. On the other hand, the report does not give much consideration to whether citizens could play a role in reflecting on whose security is discussed at any given time or what different threats look like from different people’s perspectives. And could societal resilience and coherence perhaps be improved by a multi-voiced and participatory debate on different safe futures, but also on undesirable futures, conducted when “things are well”? 

A word about democracy 

The report states that security is a prerequisite for democracy. The message can also be viewed the other way around: democracy is also needed to maintain and build extensive security.   

In the midst of crises, democracy shows its strength. Democratic, multi-voiced processes help us navigate through difficult times, utilise the nation’s resources and promote initiative and spirit of enterprise. For example, Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has led many Eastern European countries to look in the direction of the EU, which has strengthened their democratisation processes measured by many indicators.  

And again: we should remember that there are many possible futures. Niinistö’s report has even been described as apocalyptic. It emphasises the need to prepare for the worst-case scenarios, which is, in fact, part of the nature of preparedness. Alongside all preparedness speech, we should also have societal discussions about various alternative futures.  

The assumptions of the future affect the decisions we make here and now. What kind of an assumption of the future security environment will guide the EU? Are we inevitably on a path towards an era of arms race or are we also considering other possibilities and perspectives on the future of security in Europe? 

background

What report?

The report Safer together – A Path Towards Fully Prepared Union assesses The European Union’s civilian and defence preparedness and readiness and presents recommendations on how to enhance them. The report was requested by the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell.  

President Niinistö’s work has already been utilised in the Commission’s political guidelines and the commission letters of the Commissioners-designate. The findings and recommendations of the report support the work of the new Commission on various initiatives, such as the Preparedness Union Strategy and the White Paper on the future of European Defence. 

Niinistö’s report continues a series of recent ‘high-level reports’. In April 2024 was published Enrico Letta’s Report on the Future of the Single Market and in September Mario Draghi’s Report on the Future of European Competitiveness. It is hoped that the reports of the veteran decision-makers would provide support for the forthcoming European Commission. It is faced with a major task of enhancing Europe’s defence and innovation capability and economic competitiveness to the level the competitors and the tightened geopolitical situation require. 

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